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Although there exists little precedent directly supporting the
Kane decision,93 the "increasing expansion and liberalization of the
rules of disclosure" 94 in New York, as evidenced by the enactment of
CPLR article 3 1 ,1 affords substantial support for the court's conclusion.
Requiring a defendant-physician to testify as an expert witness at an
examination before trial may expose the defendant to searching inquiry,
thereby affording the plaintiff an early tactical advantage not otherwise
obtainable. However, as Justice Harnett noted, this
is the very purpose intended [by the CPLR], viz., to eliminate surprise at trial which often entails deflating one side by revealing in
full the issues and facts to be presented at trial. The sporting
theory of trial practice has long since been discredited in favor of
complete, open and mutual disclosure of evidence to be presented,
or required, at trial.96
Accordingly, limitations on pre-trial discovery which are merely formal,
97
and which do not serve a useful purpose, should be cast aside.
ARTICLE 52 -

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5222(b): Judgment creditor obtaining a restraining order held
subordinate to later assignee for benefit of creditors.
CPLR 5222(b) prohibits a person served with a restraining notice
from the "sale, assignment, transfer or interference with any property
in which he has an interest . . . until the judgment [against him] is
satisfied or vacated."' s By facilitating the collection of monetary judg93 Kennelly v. St. Mary's Hosp., 52 Misc. 2d 352, 275 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer
County 1966), involved the issue of requiring a defendant-physician to testify at an
examination before trial. See text accompanying note 85 supra. Unfortunately, the case
only represents trial court authority. By way of dictum, the court in Charlton v. Montefiore Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 153, 156 n.1, 256 N.Y.S.2d 219, 223 n.1 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1965), stated that McDermott made it "obvious" that a defendant-physician could be
compelled to give expert testimony at an examination before trial.
94 3A WK&gM 3101.36.
95 In Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1st Dep't 1964),
the court observed that "the function of the disclosure devices [contained in CPLR article
31] is no longer limited to the perpetuation of testimony in those relatively infrequent
instances when there is impending danger that it will be lost before trial." Pre-trial
disclosure is designed "to advance the function of a trial [which is] to ascertain truth and
to accelerate the disposition of suits." 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, supp. commentary at 10
(1970). See also 3A WK&M 3101.01 and cases cited at footnote la therein.
98 77 Misc. 2d at 177, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
97 See Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 235 N.E.2d 430, 431,
288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1968); 3 WK&M 3101.36.
The Legislature did not distinguish between disclosure before and during trial in
enacting CPLR 3101. SixTH Ryp. 294. Given this lack of legislative intention to distinguish
the two phases of disclosure, the application of the McDermott rule to examinations
before trial appears to be all the more appropriate.
98 CPLR 5222(b).
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ments, the section seeks to eliminate the necessity for expensive and
time-consuming enforcement proceedings. 99 In In re InternationalRibbon Mills, Ltd.,10 0 however, the Appellate Division, First Department,
emasculated the force and effect of the provision by upholding an assignment for the benefit of creditors executed subsequent to service of a
restraining notice upon the assignor.
Arjan Ribbon, two days after obtaining a judgment against International Mills, mailed a restraining notice to the judgment debtor.' 0 1
Eighteen days thereafter, International executed an assignment for the
benefit of creditors to Sturtz. 0 2 As a result of its prior service of notice,
Arjan, as judgment creditor, claimed a superior lien to that of the assignee. The Supreme Court, New York County, in granting Arjan's
petition, required the assignee to turn over a sum sufficient to satisfy the
03
judgment.
The Appellate Division reversed the lower court, noting that mere
service of a restraining notice no longer creates a lien, 10 4 and that Sturtz,
as assignee for the benefit of creditors, was a transferee who acquired the
property for fair consideration, i.e., the payment of all antecedent debts,
prior to its being levied upon. 10 International, in violating the restraining notice by assigning its assets to Sturtz, 0° however, became subject
to contempt proceedings under CPLR 5251.107 In reaching its conclu00 See 9 CAXaODY-WArr 2d, § 64:2, at 581 (1966).
100 42 App. Div. 2d 354, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Ist Dep't 1973).
101 Arjan had also delivered several property executions to the sheriffs of New York
City and Nassau County, pursuant to CPLR 5202, but they were returned unsatisfied prior
to the assignment. Id. at 855-56, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
102 Ordinarily, mere delivery of an execution to a sheriff, until returned, vests the
judgment creditor with rights superior to those of any subsequent transferee not protected
by CPLR 5202(a). Among the persons protected by section 5202(a) is "a transferee who
acquired the debt or property for fair consideration before it was levied upon." See 6

WK=M

5202.12. Satisfaction of an antecedent debt is considered to constitute "fair con-

sideration," unless the judgment creditor can show that the transfer was either not made
in satisfaction of a debt or was made with intent to defraud. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 272
(McKinney 1945). In International Ribbon, Arjan could show neither. Therefore, since

the accounts receivable assigned to Sturtz for the benefit of creditors constituted payment
of antecedent debts, the assignee became a transferee protected by CPLR 5202(a).
103 42 App. Div. 2d at 855, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
104 42 App. Div. 2d at 858, 852 N.Y.S2d at 5. See In re Joseph H. Fisher & Co., 48
Misc. 2d 821, 252 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964); Rinzler v. New York City
Transit Authority, 37 Misc. 2d 77, 284 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962); 6
WK&M 522221.
105 See note 102 supra.
106 See Rossman Corp. v. Polizzi, 231 App. Div. 872, 246 N.Y.S. 849 (2d Dep't 1980)
(mem.); In re Nassau Expressway, 56 Misc. 2d 602, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1968).
107 CPLR 5251 states in part: "Refusal or wilful neglect of any person to obey a
subpoena or restraining notice issued

See note 113 infra.

..

s hall ...

be punishable as a contempt of court."
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sion, the First Department noted that while the original draft of CPLR
5222(b) would have made the transfer ineffective as against a judgment
creditor who had served the restraining notice,108 that provision was
deliberately omitted from the final version. 10 9 Thus, while it might be
argued that the language of the statute is still mandatory and a transfer therefore void, in the face of a deliberate deletion of just that provision, the legislative intent must be construed otherwise." 0
Justice Kupperman, in dissenting, relied upon In re Nassau Expressway,"' wherein the Supreme Court, Queens County, five years
earlier had decided a similar case in favor of the judgment creditor.
The court therein felt that to "give superior effect to the assignment
executed in violation of the restraining notice is to make a mockery of
the provisions of CPLR 5222."u12 NassauExpressway has also been cited
favorably by Professor David D. Siegel, who notes that a contrary holding in such a situation would afford the judgment creditor a "near impotent remedy." 18 He concludes that CPLR 5234, which governs
priorities among creditors, does not control in the present context since
no order or execution is involved. Therefore, the equities between the
parties should determine the outcome. 11 4 Clearly, a creditor who dili-

gently reduces his claim to judgment against the debtor deserves preference over competing creditors who fail to so act.
While the restraining notice remains an attractive enforcement
device, 115 it should be recognized that it is "no longer effectual to affect
priorities, as was the case under the decisional precedents under the
Civil Practice Act." 116 Despite the apparent inequities in such a deci108 THIRD REP. 252 had provided:
While a restraining notice is in effect, no transfer, whether by the garnishee or
by the judgment debtor, of property or of a debt subject to the notice shall be
effective against the judgment creditor who served the notice, except as otherwise
provided by law or order of the court.

CPA 799-a provided similar protection to the judgment creditor.
109 FIFTH REP. 562.

110 See 6 WK&M 7 5222.20.
11156 Misc. 2d 602, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968) (mem.).
112 Id. at 602, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
118 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 5222, supp. commentary at 96 (1968). Although the fine in
the contempt proceeding would be the equivalent of the damages caused by the divestiture,
i.e., the amount owed to the creditor, the cause of action is against the debtor who has
just disposed of his assets. Clearly, the likelihood of recovery of the fine at this point is
minimal.
114 Id.
115 Advantages of the restraining notice include the availability of service by mail
and duty-free filing. However, one author has noted that "the best that can be accomplished with a restraining notice is to immobilize property or debts." Donohue, Enforcement of Judgments Other Than by Execution Under the CPLR, 9 N.Y.L.F. 300, 316
(1963). That advantage seems to have vanished with the International decision.
116 City of New York v. Panzirer, 23 App. Div. 2d 158, 163, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288
(lst Dep't 1965).
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sion, it may nevertheless have a beneficial result by encouraging "the
judgment creditor to take affirmative steps to satisfy his judgment ....

117

Yet, the potential advantages of the present application do not render
the Internationaldecision less harsh or inequitable. Since the Appellate
Division has correctly applied the law as it currently exists, a legislative
reevaluation would seem appropriate.
62 - ATACHMENT
CPLR 6220: Disclosure order obtained where the assets of a defendant
held by a factoring agent were attached.
ARTICLE

Following the procurement of an order of attachment, CPLR 6220
allows a plaintiff to request that the court issue an order of disclosure
requiring the defendant, or the holder of the defendant's assets, to reveal the nature and extent of the property subject to attachment." 8
Every order of attachment need not be accompanied by an order of
disclosure since the requirement of disclosure rests within the discretion
of the court.1 1 9 However, when a disclosure order is obtained, its
validity rests upon the validity of the underlying order of attachment' 2 0
In Buy Fabrics,Inc. v. ADA Co.,121 the plaintiff brought an action
to recover the balance due on goods sold and delivered to the defendant.
In order to secure any available assets of the defendant, the plaintiff,
pursuant to CPLR 6202,122 attached the defendant's accounts receivable
held by a Georgia bank under a factoring agreement' 23 between it and
117 6 WK&-M

j 5222.21.

118 CPLR 6220 provides:
Upon motion of any interested person, at any time after the granting of an order
of attachment and prior to final judgment in the action, upon such notice as the
court may direct, the court may order disclosure by any person of information
regarding any property in which the defendant has an interest, or any debts
owing to the defendant.
119 The use of the word "may" in CPLR 6220 suggests the discretionary nature of the
disclosure order. See 7A WK&M
6220.02.
120 See Fisher v. Nash, 47 App. Div. 234, 62 N.YS. 646 (4th Dep't 1900); Cronan v.
Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950); Clinton Trust Co. v. Compania
Azucarera Central Mabay S.A., 172 Misc. 148, 14 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd,
258 App. Div. 782, 15 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dep't 1939) (mem.).
12176 Misc. 2d 607, 351 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
122 CPLR 6202 allows the attachment of any debt or property against which a money
judgment may be enforced pursuant to CPLR 5201. CPLR 5201(b) provides that a money
judgment may be enforced against any debt "whether it was incurred within or without
the state, to or from a resident or non-resident .... "
12 A factor is a financing organization which engages in the purchase of trade
receivables. The function of a factor is to advance credit for its client. In the typical
factoring arrangement, the client, immediately after a sale, sends the invoice of sale to the
factor. Upon receipt of the invoice, the factor transfers cash, equivalent to the invoice
price less an appropriate discount, to the client. Thereafter, the factor collects the amount
Acdue from the client's sale. See G. WE.scu, C. ZLATKOVicH & J. WHrr, IErmEDIrAn
COUNING 431 (1968). Statutory provisions concerning factoring are contained in N.Y. PEns.

